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We propose quantum cryptographic protocols to secretly communicate a reference frame—
unspeakable information in the sense it cannot be encoded into a string of bits. Two distant parties
can secretly align their Cartesian axes by exchanging N spin 1/2 particles, achieving the optimal
accuracy 1/N . A possible eavesdropper cannot gain any information without being detected.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk,03.65.Ud,91.10.Ws
Any communication about the properties of a physi-
cal object requires not only the transmission of a string
of bits, but also the existence of notions shared between
sender and receiver. For example, to communicate the
length of an object, they must agree on a unit of length.
In many cases, the natural units of length, time, and
mass [1] provide a common standard that allows any two
parties to communicate by simply exchanging bits, even
though they have never met. However, such standard ref-
erences do not exist for all properties, as some cannot be
communicated as strings of bits [2, 3] and are hence re-
ferred to as unspeakable information [4, 5]. For example,
due to the fundamental isotropy of space, a string of bits
can encode only the relative orientation of two directions,
but not the absolute orientation of a single direction in
space. In such cases, the only possibility for the sender
to establish a shared notion with the receiver is to send
a physical object—such as a gyroscope—that provides
the common standard. This situation arises whenever
sender and receiver try to establish a shared reference
frame (SRF), e.g. by aligning their Cartesian axes, or by
synchronizing their clocks.
Using quantum cryptography, one can securely send
speakable information (i.e. strings of bits) through a pub-
lic channel. One might then ask whether the same is true
for unspeakable information. The answer is not trivial
since to convey unspeakable info a physical carrier must
be sent, and it can be intercepted by an eavesdropper. In
this paper we present quantum cryptographic protocols
to encode spatial directions and reference frames so that
no eavesdropper can obtain information on them. This is
useful also for quantum cryptography, since private SRFs
are an important resource to realize both classical and
quantum secret communication [6]. Here, we consider
communication through the transmission of N spin 1/2
particles. We start by showing a simple, experimentally
feasible protocol that uses N shared secret bits and N
separable states to communicate a secret direction with
accuracy 1/
√
N . Then, we present the optimal proto-
col, which exploits entanglement and secretly transmits a
whole Cartesian frame. Such a protocol employs 3 logN
secret bits to achieve accuracy 1/N . Remarkably, this
amount of secret bits exactly coincides with the number
of secret bits that can be exchanged once a private SRF
is established [6]. Such a tight balance provides a new
understanding of reference frames as a communication
resource. Note that the above protocols do not need the
two parties to possess the shared secret bits beforehand:
They can obtain them using quantum key distribution,
which does not necessarily require a prior shared refer-
ence [7, 8]. This suggests that protocols that do not
use prior classical randomness can be implemented. We
conclude the paper by providing two such protocols that
require only quantum and classical communication over
a public channel.
Separable protocol using secret random bits.—The in-
tuitive idea of this protocol is that two parties (say Alice
and Bob) can transform a secret shared random string
into a secret shared direction. Imagine that Alice wants
to communicate to Bob the secret direction of her z-axis.
For each 0 and 1 in the secret string, she sends a spin
1/2 particle pointing respectively up and down (accord-
ing to her own z axis). Then, Bob just needs to rotate
the z axis of his Stern-Gerlach apparatus until its mea-
surement results (0 for “up” and 1 for “down”) match
the bits of the shared secret string. When this happens,
he knows that he has aligned his z axis with Alice’s. A
possible eavesdropper Eve will not be able to gain any
information on the direction of the z axis, since she does
not know the secret string. In fact, from her point of
view a random sequence of spin up/spin down is equiva-
lent to the maximally chaotic state, where the spins are
randomly oriented in any direction she might choose to
sample. Moreover, if Eve is tampering with the commu-
nication, Bob will find it out as any direction he chooses
for his Stern-Gerlach apparatus will never yield the secret
string as outcome bits.
A more practical implementation of the above proto-
col can be obtained if Bob performs all measurements
aligning his Stern-Gerlach apparatus alternately along
his own x, y and z axes. The probability that Alice’s
spin up states (identified by zeros in the shared secret
key) will have outcome “up” in Bob’s z-oriented Stern-
Gerlach apparatus is p(θ) = cos2 θ/2, where θ is the un-
known angle between Alice and Bob’s z axes. This is also
the probability that Alice’s spin down states (identified
2by ones) will have outcome “down” at Bob’s apparatus.
Therefore, Bob can estimate such probability from his
outcomes on N spins as p¯θ = [N(up, 0)+N(down, 1)]/N ,
where N(i, j) is the number of spins that gave outcome
i when the corresponding shared secret bit was j. Once
the angle θ has been estimated from p¯θ, Bob orients his
Stern-Gerlach apparatus along his x and y axes, and re-
peats the procedure to recover the angles between these
and Alice’s z axis. The eavesdropper Eve can be de-
tected by Bob. In fact, her action would result in a de-
polarization of the transmitted spins and the three angles
Bob recovers would be inconsistent. He can discover it
if the sum of their squared cosines differs from one by
more than a purely statistical error would allow. The
accuracy of Bob’s procedure can be evaluated as follows.
The rms error in the estimate of p(θ) from the data is
∆p(θ) =
√
p¯θ − p¯2θ/
√
N . Then, from error propagation
theory, the error on each of the angles θ estimated from
p¯θ is
∆θ = ∆p¯/
∣∣∣∣∂p(θ)∂θ
∣∣∣∣ =
√
p¯θ(1− p¯θ)
p(θ)[1 − p(θ)]
1√
N
≃ 1√
N
, (1)
since p¯θ → p(θ) for large N . Thus, Bob’s overall error on
his estimate of the direction of Alice’s z axis using 3N
spins will be 3/
√
N . Notice that, without using entangled
states at the preparation stage, the 1/
√
N asymptotic
scaling cannot be beaten [9].
To send a spatial direction, the exchanged qubits must
possess directional information, as is the case of spin 1/2
particles. Nevertheless, a partial directional information
can be encoded also in the polarization of a photon. In
fact, using single photons one can transmit a direction
in the plane orthogonal to the wave vector. In this case
Bob just needs to orient his polarizers in two directions
(say the x and y axes), and the above procedure gives
him Alice’s secret direction with accuracy 2
√
2/N .
Optimal protocol using secret random bits.—The pre-
vious protocol requires N qubits and N secret bits to
communicate a secret spatial direction with an rms er-
ror 3
√
3/N . Now we show that a suitable use of entan-
glement allows to transmit a whole frame of Cartesian
axes with rms error 1/N , with only 3 logN secret bits
needed. To this purpose, we first recall the basic features
of the optimal protocol to publicly transmit a Cartesian
frame [3], then showing how to modify it in order to
achieve unconditional security.
The optimal state for the reference frame communica-
tion requires the decomposition of the Hilbert spaceH⊗N
of N spin 1/2 particles into irreducible representations of
the rotation group. This decomposition is given by
H⊗N =
N/2⊕
j=0( 1
2
)
Hj ⊗ Cmj , (2)
where j is the quantum number of the total angular mo-
mentum, ranging from 0(12 ) to N/2 for N even (odd), Hj
is a 2j + 1 dimensional space supporting an irrep of the
rotation group, and Cmj is a multiplicity space, whose
dimension mj is equal to the number of equivalent irreps
corresponding to the quantum number j. In this decom-
position of the Hilbert space, the action of a collective
rotation U⊗Ng , g ∈ SU(2) becomes
U⊗Ng =
N/2⊕
j=0( 1
2
)
U jg ⊗ 1mj , (3)
where {U jg} is the irreducible representation with angu-
lar momentum j, and 1 d denotes the identity in a d-
dimensional Hilbert space. From Eq. (3) it is clear that
the multiplicity spaces are the rotationally invariant sub-
systems of the global Hilbert space H⊗N .
For large N , the optimal states for the transmission of
a reference frame are given by [3]
|A〉 =
N
2
−1⊕
j=0( 1
2
)
Aj√
2j + 1
|Ej〉 , (4)
Aj being suitable coefficients (Aj ≈
√
4/N sin
(
2pij
N
)
for
N ≫ 1), and |Ej〉 ∈ Hj ⊗ Cmj being the maximally
entangled vector
|Ej〉 =
j∑
m=−j
|jm〉|m〉 , (5)
where {|jm〉 ∈ Hj} are the eigenstates of the total an-
gular momentum Jz, and the vector |m〉 runs on the
first 2j + 1 elements of a basis of the multiplicity space
Cmj . Since the state |A〉 is prepared by Alice referring
to her Cartesian frame, from Bob’s point of view all
spins are rotated by the unknown rotation g ∈ SU(2)
that connects his axes with Alice’s. Accordingly, Bob
receives the state U⊗Ng |A〉, and his aim is to perform
the best possible measurement to infer g. For a state of
the form (4) such measurement is given by the POVM
M(h) dh = U⊗Nh |B〉〈B|U †⊗Nh dh, where dh is the invari-
ant measure over the rotation group, and |B〉 is
|B〉 =
⊕
j
√
2j + 1 |Ej〉 . (6)
The use of the state |A〉 and of the measurementM(h) al-
lows to communicate optimally a Cartesian frame with an
asymptotic rms error 1/N [3]. The optimality proof for
this protocol is given in Ref. [10]. A transmission scheme
using only the state |A〉 is not secret, since anybody can
intercept the spins, perform the optimal measurement,
and reprepare the state according to the outcome.
To construct a secret protocol, notice that the vector
|Ej〉 in the state |A〉 can be replaced by any other max-
imally entangled vector |Wj〉 = (Wj ⊗ 1mj )|Ej〉, where
3Wj is a local unitary on Hj . With the same substitu-
tion in the POVM (6), the outcome probabilities in the
orientation measurement are unchanged. Thus the esti-
mation is still optimal. The idea then is to randomize the
choice of the maximally entangled vector |Wj〉 in order
to make it impossible for Eve to extract any kind of in-
formation about Alice’s axes. To this purpose, consider
the unitaries Wj,pj ,qj defined
Wj,pj ,qj =
j∑
m=−j
exp
(2pii mqj
2j + 1
)
|m⊕ pj〉〈m| , (7)
⊕ here denoting addition modulo 2j+1. These unitaries
form a representation of the “shift and multiply” group
Z2j+1 ×Z2j+1, which is irreducible on Hj . A completely
secure communication can be obtained if Alice sends one
of the states
|A{pj ,qj}〉 =
N
2
−1⊕
j=0( 1
2
)
Aj√
2j + 1
(
Wj,pj ,qj ⊗ 1mj
) |Ej〉 , (8)
chosen according to a secret random sequence {pj, qj}
that she shares only with Bob. The number of possible se-
quences is C =
∑N/2
j=0( 1
2
)
(2j+1)2 ≃ O(N3). This means
that Alice and Bob asymptotically need 3 logN bits of
shared randomness. From the point of view of Eve, the
randomization procedure is equivalent to the preparation
of the mixed state ρE =
∑
{pj ,qj}
|A{pj ,qj}〉〈A{pj ,qj}|/C.
Due to the irreducibility of the representations {Wj,pj ,qj}
this averaged state can be easily calculated, obtaining
ρE =
N
2
−1⊕
j=0( 1
2
)
|Aj |2
(2j + 1)2
1 2j+1 ⊗
j∑
m=−j
|m〉〈m| . (9)
Using Eq. (3), it is immediate to see that Eve’s state
ρE is completely invariant under rotations, therefore no
useful information can be extracted from it about the
orientation of Alice’s axes. On the other hand, since
Bob knows which pure state |A{pj ,qj}〉 was sent, he can
perform the optimal orientation measurement. He then
recovers Alice’s axes with the asymptotically optimal rms
error 1/N .
This result sheds a new light on the role of private
shared reference frames (SRF) as a physical resource. In
fact, we can relate the above protocol with the crypto-
graphic protocol of Ref. [6], where a private SRF is used
to communicate a secret string of bits. While in our case
we have asymptotically
N qbits+ 3 logN secret bits −→ private SRF , (10)
in the case of Ref. [6] one has
N qbits+ private SRF −→ 3 logN secret bits . (11)
In other words, the comparison of the two results gives a
tight balance between the number of secret random bits
needed to establish a private SRF and the secret classical
capacity associated to it.
Is it really necessary to have a string of secret bits
to establish a private SRF? Remarkably, this is not the
case. In the following we sketch two alternative protocols,
modeled on the BB84 [11] and the Ekert protocols [12], in
which the private SRF is established by only using quan-
tum and classical communication over an authenticated
public channel: The main idea of both protocols is to
exploit the fact that the information encoded in the mul-
tiplicity spaces Cmj of Eq. (2) is frame-independent [7],
since according to Eq. (3) the multiplicity spaces are in-
variant under rotations. Thus, even though Alice and
Bob do not share a Cartesian frame, they can exchange
qubits and test whether an eavesdropper is acting in the
rotationally invariant subsystems of the Hilbert space. If
the security level is too low, they can decide to abort
the protocol (before any reference information is trans-
mitted). This strategy prevents Eve to access the infor-
mation encoded in the multiplicity spaces, namely her
POVM must have the form Pi =
⊕
j Pij ⊗ 1mj , for some
suitable Pij ≥ 0,
∑
i Pij = 1 2j+1. Since for states of the
form (4) representation spaces and multiplicity spaces are
maximally entangled, Eve’s measurement gives no infor-
mation about Alice’s axes (again the state seen by Eve
is the ρE of Eq. (9)).
BB84-type protocol—With probability 1/2 Alice sends
the state U⊗Nh |A〉, where h is a random rotation, oth-
erwise she sends a test-state. The possible test states
are
τj,m =
1 2j+1
2j + 1
⊗ |m〉〈m| and τ˜j,m = 1 2j+1
2j + 1
⊗ |m˜〉〈m˜| ,
(12)
where {|m〉} and {|m˜〉} are two bases of Cmj related
by a Fourier transform. An eavesdropper cannot tell
whether the state U⊗Nh |A〉 or the test states were sent,
as there is a large overlap between them, i.e. a fidelity
F = A2j/(2j + 1)
2 (of order 1/N3 for j ≈ N/4). On
the other hand, Bob performs with probability 1/2 the
optimal measurement of orientation, otherwise he per-
forms a test-measurement. For the test-measurement he
randomly chooses one of the two von Neumann measure-
ment Vj,m = 1 2j+1 ⊗ |m〉〈m|, or V˜j,m = 1 2j+1 ⊗ |m˜〉〈m˜|.
Then, as in the BB84 protocol, using the authenticated
public classical channel, Alice and Bob declare the “ba-
sis” they used: Alice announces whether she prepared an
orientation-state, a test-state of the kind τ , or a test state
of the kind τ˜ , and similarly Bob announces whether he
measured the orientation, the observable V , or the ob-
servable V˜ . They keep only the cases where Bob’s mea-
surement coincided with Alice’s preparation, and discard
the rest. Alice announces the values of j and m for the
test states she sent, so that Bob can check whether or
not the results of his measurements match with her data.
4In this way, an eavesdropper in the rotationally invariant
subsystems can be detected, and Bob can decide to abort
the protocol, if the security level is not sufficiently high.
Otherwise, Alice publicly communicates the random ro-
tation h she performed on the optimal state |A〉. On
each of the states Alice sent, Bob estimated the rotation
gh with rms error 1/N , where g is the unknown rotation
connecting his axes with Alice’s ones. Thus, knowing h,
Bob can immediately infer g and align his axes. Notice
that here N is the number of spins in each of the states
that Alice sends. If she sends M states, the total num-
ber of transmitted spins is MN and Bob’s accuracy will
scale as 4/
√
MN (where the square root comes from the
central limit theorem, and the factor 4 refers to the fact
that only 1/4 of the states are used in average for the
orientation measurement). Compared with the previous
protocol, the scaling in accuracy with the total number
MN of spins is sub-optimal, but the decrease in accuracy
is needed because of the elimination of the prior shared
random bits.
Ekert-type protocol.—Alice starts with two sets of N
spin 1/2 particles, half of which she sends to Bob. The
Hilbert spaces of both sets of spins, H⊗NA and H⊗NB , can
be decomposed as in Eq. (2), and she can prepare the
entangled state
|Φ〉AB =
N
2
−1⊕
j=0( 1
2
)
Aj√
(2j + 1) mj
∑
m,n
|jm〉A|n〉A|jm〉B |n〉B ,
(13)
where Aj are the same coefficients as in the optimal state
in Eq. (4). Note that for any value of the angular mo-
mentum the state |Φ〉AB exhibits a maximal entangle-
ment between the multiplicity spaces C
mj
A and C
mj
B . For
this reason, an eavesdropper in the rotationally invariant
subsystems can be detected by Alice and Bob by test-
ing Bell inequalities, as in the original Ekert protocol:
to evade detection Eve must not act on the rotationally
invariant subsystems of Bob. A SRF is established when
Alice and Bob both perform the optimal orientation-
measurement, given by Eq. (6). In fact, the probability
density that they measure the rotations hA and hB is
p(hA, hB) = 〈Φ|M(hA)⊗U⊗Ng †M(hB)U⊗Ng |Φ〉, where g
is the unknown rotation connecting their axes. A short
calculation allows to derive the following equality
p(hA, hB) = 〈Φ| M(hA)⊗ U⊗Ng
†
M(hB)U
⊗N
g |Φ〉 (14)
= 〈A|M(hAh−1B g)|A〉 ,
which implies that hAh
−1
B g is distributed with the rms
error 1/N of the optimal orientation measurement, even
though the outcomes hA and hB are completely random,
as the local states of Alice and Bob are rotationally in-
variant. Once Alice has communicated (with the authen-
ticated public channel) the outcome hA of her measure-
ment, Bob can use this information to retrieve the un-
known rotation g with the precision 1/N . Again, since
Eve cannot touch the rotationally invariant subsystems,
she can gain no information about Alice’s axes. Also
here, part of the exchanged spins is employed (in the
Bell inequalities tests) to make up for the absence of the
prior shared secret bits.
Conclusions.— In this Letter we have shown that
quantum mechanics allows one to secretly communicate
directions in space, either with or without the need of
prior secret random bits. We have given a simple proto-
col that needs no entanglement and an entangled proto-
col that achieves the ultimate bounds in the precision of
reference frame transmission. The unentangled protocol
can be easily implemented experimentally using spin 1/2
particles or single photon polarization states. Two fur-
ther protocols that do not need secret random bits have
also been presented. The ideas of this paper have been
presented for spatial reference frames, however, they can
be exploited to achieve the secret transmission of any
possible reference frame, e.g. to obtain a secret clock
synchronization.
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